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Managing Interjurisdictional Waters
under the Great Lakes Charter Annex
Mark Squillace and Sandra Zellmer
n spring 1998, the Nova Group of Sault Ste.
Marie, Ontario, proposed to ship nearly 160 mil-
lion gallons of Lake Superior water annually via
tanker to Asia. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIS-
SION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 44 (2000) (2000
IJC Report). Nova's proposal coincided with declining
water levels in the Great Lakes, and the resulting pub-
lic outcry and pressure from other Great Lakes gov-
ernments persuaded Ontario to revoke Nova's permit
just a few months later. The Nova proposal prompted
the eight American states and two Canadian provinces
bordering the Great Lakes to revisit the Great Lakes
Charter of 1985 and adopt Annex 2001. See Annex to
the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, available at
www.cglg.org/1 pdfs/Annex2001 .pdf (Annex 2001).
Annex 2001 commits the Great Lakes governors and
premiers to improve their management of Great
Lakes water resources through binding agreements.
Their self-imposed, three-year deadline for meeting
this mandate is June 18, 2004. This article examines
the history of water resources management in the
Great Lakes Basin and considers the challenges and
opportunities presented by Annex 2001.
The Great Lakes-Huron, Ontario, Michigan,
Erie and Superior-cover approximately ninety-five
thousand square miles and contain 20 percent of the
world's and 95 percent of North America's fresh sur-
face water. Due to their vast size, Great Lakes water
levels remain remarkably steady overall, with normal
fluctuation ranging from one to two feet in any given
year. Even so, Great Lakes water levels are highly
sensitive to climatic variability, as demonstrated dur-
ing the severe droughts of the 1930s and 1960s. See
2000 IJC Report at § 2. In recent years, Great Lakes
water levels have been on a downward trend, and
they are currently at their lowest level since 1965.
There is growing consensus that climate change will
have a dramatic affect on global precipitation pat-
terns and the hydrologic cycle, and lake levels in the
Great Lakes possibly could drop an additional two to
five feet before the end of the twenty-first century.
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Meanwhile, demand for water is plainly on the
rise. In 1997, the United Nations reported that 40 per-
cent of the world's population suffered from water
shortages that limit economic and social development.
See Paul Lewis, U.N. Report Warns of Problems over
Dwindling Water Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at
A6. Six years later, it predicted that "the overriding
problem ... of the 21st century [will be] one of water
quality and management." See UNITED NATIONS, THE
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT-WATER FOR
PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE (Mar. 5, 2003).
Although data on water consumption in the Great
Lakes Basin is incomplete, with many uses unreported,
a 2002 assessment estimates that, as of 1998, around
2,200 million gallons per day or 3,350 cubic feet per
second (cfs) are consumed, principally for agriculture,
domestic supplies, and industry. See INTERNATIONAL
WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE, PROTECTION OF
THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: THREE YEAR RE-
VIEW 48 (Nov. 2002).
In addition to consumptive uses, substantial quan-
tities of water are diverted both into and out of the
Great Lakes Basin. The most notorious of the four
major diversions began in 1848, when the State of Illi-
nois constructed a canal to divert water from Lake
Michigan for Chicago's water supply and sewage dis-
posal, along with navigation. Extensive litigation en-
sued between Illinois, the other Great Lakes states and
the United States Army Corps of Engineers. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930). Illinois con-
tinues to divert, on average, 3,200 cfs, lowering the
levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron by 0.21 feet. See
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, GREAT LAKES
DIVERSIONS AND CONSUMPTIVE USES: A REPORT TO
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA UNDER THE 1977 REFERENCE 15 (1985).
The oldest and the largest of the diversions is the
Welland Canal, which was built in 1829 to move water
across the Niagara Peninsula so that ships could bypass
Niagara Falls. The flow through the canal has aver-
aged 9,200 cfs annually since 1973, lowering the levels
of Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Superior by one to two
inches, and of Lake Erie by about five inches. Id. at
16-18. Despite the Welland Canal's enormous impact
on the upper Great Lakes-more than all of the upper
basin's consumptive uses combined-it is not treated as
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a consumptive use because it does not divert water out
of the basin. Its impact on the upper basin, however, is
no different than a consumptive use, and the substan-
tial loss of upper basin water through this diversion de-
serves more attention.
Another significant diversion brings water from
tributaries of James Bay into Lake Superior to transport
pulpwood logs and provide hydroelectric power. This
project counterbalances the Chicago and Welland
Canal diversions by raising the levels of Lakes Superior,
Michigan, and Huron by approximately one-half of a
foot. Id. Finally, the New York State Barge Canal takes
water from the Niagara River for navigation purposes
and returns all of it to Lake Ontario. Id. at 20. Togeth-
er, these four diversions raise the mean levels of Lake
Superior by 0.07 feet and of Lake Ontario by 0.08 feet,
and lower the mean levels of Lakes Michigan and
Huron by 0.02 feet and of Lake Erie by 0.33 feet. Id.
A surge of interest in diversions from the Great
Lakes occurred during the 1980s, when western inter-
ests proposed to use Great Lakes water to recharge the
Ogallala Aquifer, to supply water for a coal slurry
pipeline in Wyoming, and to improve navigation on
the Mississippi River. Even though these proposals
arose during a time of record-high water levels, they
caused alarm in the basin, and protectionist legislation
was enacted at both state and federal levels.
The vast quantities of water available in the Great
Lakes makes continued interest in the resource in-
evitable. Indeed, the Nova Company is not alone in
proposing twenty-first century export or diversion
schemes. In 2001, the city of Webster, New York, situ-
ated on the shore of Lake Ontario, ran ads in the New
York Times and Wall Street ]ournal proclaiming "Water
for Sale." See Water for Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2001, at B2 1. The town received inquiries from a Texas
businessman who proposed putting the water in rail
cars and shipping it south. Political pressure from
Great Lakes governors squelched that plan. In 2002,
the Perrier Company began pumping and bottling mil-
lions of gallons of groundwater within the basin, gen-
erating intense controversy in Michigan and
Wisconsin. See Joan Lowy, Water Wars Pit Bottlers vs.
Residents, GRAND RAPIDS PR., Mar. 31, 2002, at Al.
While the total volume of water from this project is
relatively insignificant when compared with the mas-
sive diversions and other water uses in the basin, the
response underscores the significant political attention
that will likely accompany any Great Lakes water man-
agement proposal.
Economic constraints, however, make large-scale
water exports from the Great Lakes Basin impractical.
Unless the price of water increases dramatically, trans-
portation costs make shipments to far-away countries
or the arid American West unlikely. 2000 IJC Report at
16. Nonetheless, as worldwide demand for fresh water
continues to grow while supplies shrink, the economic
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viability of future water exports is difficult to predict.
Uncertainties over future water trends offer an incen-
tive to put in place a management regime that will help
ensure the long-term health and sustainability of the
Great Lakes Basin and its water resources.
The Law of the Great Lakes
Annex 2001 is a notable example of an unusually
cooperative, multipartisan interstate and international
climate, and it provides a remarkable opportunity for
managing and sustaining Great Lakes water resources.
The Annex was built on a solid foundation of Great
Lakes water law that began with the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909.
Early in the twentieth century, boundary waters
between Canada and the United States, and especially
the Great Lakes, were a "significant political irritant"
between the two countries, with points of contention
ranging from navigation to power generation to diver-
sions. See Stephen J. Toope and Jutta Brunnee, Fresh-
water Regimes: The Mandate of the International Joint
Commission, 15 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273, 277
(1998). In 1909, the United States and Canada entered
into the Boundary Waters Treaty to address diversions
while ensuring that each nation's sovereign interests
remained intact. Treaty Between the United States and
Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Ques-
tions Arising Between the United States and Canada,
Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448. The
Boundary Waters Treaty established the IJC, a
six-member joint tribunal with jurisdiction over ob-
structions or diversions on either side of the border af-
fecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters.
The most important role of the IJC has been to pre-
pare analytical reports on issues, or references, upon
the request of the governments.
The Great Lakes Basin Compact, initially adopted
in the 1950s and subsequently endorsed by Congress
and signed into law in 1968, commits the Great Lakes
states to collaborate on regional issues. Pub. L. No.
90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968). Among the compact's
more significant provisions was the creation of the
Great Lakes Commission, an interstate compact
agency that assists in coordinating decisions pertaining
to Great Lakes diversions and water use. The
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec have recently ac-
cepted associate member status on the Great Lakes
Commission, which will strengthen a partnership be-
tween the governments.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the alarming decline
in Great Lakes water quality drew the attention of
both Canada and the United States. The Cuyahoga
River, a tributary to Lake Erie, smoldered and caught
fire when a spark landed in its polluted waters, provid-
ing one impetus for the Clean Water Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 etseq. The two Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreements between the United States and
Canada followed closely on its heels. See Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Apr. 15, 1972,
U.S.-Can., 23 U.S.T. 301 and Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can.,
30 U.S.T. 1383 (amended 1983 and 1987) (GLWQA).
Although the GLWQA is concerned primarily with
controlling chemical pollutants, it adopts an ecosystem
approach that could have some bearing on water quan-
tity as well as water quality. The agreement commits
the parties to "make a maximum effort to develop pro-
grams, practices and technology necessary for a better
understanding of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem,"
with the goal of restoring and maintaining "the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." GLWQA, at art.
II. Article lV commits the parties to protect beneficial
uses of water from the cumulative effects of pollutants.
A 1983 protocol to the GLWQA declares the "right of
each country in the use of the Great Lakes waters,"
while reaffirming the parties' intent to prevent pollu-
tion resulting from population growth, resource devel-
opment and water usage. Protocol Amending the 1978
Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, Oct. 16, 1983,
U.S.-Can., 35 U.S.T. 2370. For further discussion of
the GLWQA's control of chemical pollutants, see the
article by David Fischer on page 51 in this issue.
In 1985, in response to the perceived threat posed
by a proposal to divert Great Lakes water for a coal
slurry pipeline from the Powder River Basin in
Wyoming, the Great Lakes governors and premiers
signed the Great Lakes Charter to address diversions
and consumptive uses. See The Great Lakes Charter,
Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water
Resources. The charter provides for notification and
consultation among the governors and premiers for
proposals to divert more than five million gallons per
day (gpd) over a thirty-day period. In order to partici-
pate in the charter's consultation process, the states
and provinces are required to adopt a registration re-
quirement for all new or increased consumptive uses
greater than one hundred thousand gpd, and a permit
system for all new or increased diversions or con-
sumptive uses that exceed two million gpd. These re-
quirements force the Great Lakes jurisdictions away
from the common law doctrine of riparian water law,
which has historically limited the governmental role
in water resource management. Unfortunately, only
Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, and
Ontario have adopted both registration and permit
requirements. While Quebec continues to work on its
water management program, neither Indiana nor
Pennsylvania has adopted permit requirements, and
instead of regulating water usage, Michigan enacted a
statute that merely prohibits out-of-basin diversions.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32703 (West
1999). Although the Michigan law almost certainly
violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution in light of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941 (1982), as a practical matter the validity of the
Michigan statute is not likely of much consequence
because the federal Water Resources Development
Act (WRDA), 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20, which is de-
scribed below, effectively precludes most out-of-basin
diversions from the Great Lakes.
Congress granted specific authority to the Great
Lakes governors to control water usage in 1986 when
it adopted WRDA. Id. WRDA provides that no diver-
sion of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin may occur
without the unanimous approval of all of the affected
governors. To emphasize the local nature of decision-
making, Congress prohibited any federal agency from
studying the feasibility of diverting Great Lakes water
unless all the Great Lakes governors first approved
the study. Id. § 1962d-20(e). Congress amended
WRDA in 2000 to add that all Great Lakes governors
must also approve any exports out of the basin. Id.
§ 1962d-20(b)(3). As a result, a single governor can
wield veto power over any proposal for a water diver-
sion or export from the basin. The 2000 amendments
also foreshadowed the 2001 Annex by declaring con-
gressional policy "to encourage the Great Lakes
states, in consultation with the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism
that provides a common conservation standard em-
bodying the principles of water conservation and re-
source improvement for making decisions concerning
the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes
Basin." Id. § 1962d-20(b)(2).
As of 2003, the only diversion to receive formal
WRDA approval allows the City of Akron, Ohio, to di-
vert 4.8 million gallons per day from Lake Erie to
serve three unincorporated areas outside of the Great
Lakes watershed. The Akron project is required to re-
turn an equivalent quantity of water to Lake Erie from
the Ohio River watershed.
The Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001
For the most part, the Great Lakes Charter, along
with WRDA and the Boundary Waters Treaty, have
been viewed as adequate to serve the needs of this tem-
perate region. Water shortages and contentious dis-
putes over water resources in the Great Lakes Basin
have been relatively rare. Nova's proposal to export
water from Lake Superior in 1998, however, raised the
specter of possible future problems and prompted the
Canadian government to declare a moratorium on all
bulk water exports from all boundary waters, including
the Great Lakes. Meanwhile, the Canadian and United
States governments asked the IJC to examine the issue
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of water exports. In February 2000, the IJC issued a re-
port and recommendations, one of which was that de-
finitive standards should be developed to govern
proposals to remove water from the basin. See 2000
IJC Report at 49. The governors and premiers re-
sponded with Annex 2001. A comprehensive new set of
laws that will provide for management of the water re-
sources of the Great Lakes for many years to come is a
necessary next step.
Annex 2001 provides both a challenge and an op-
portunity to accomplish this objective by establishing
a framework for a new set of binding agreements
governing withdrawals of water from the Great
Lakes. The Annex encompasses the entire Great
Lakes Basin, which includes "streams, rivers, lakes,
connecting channels, and other bodies of water, in-
cluding tributary groundwater" which naturally flow
into the Great Lakes. Annex 2001, at 3. The term
"withdrawal" means any removal
of water for consumptive use, re-
gardless of whether the water re-
turns to the basin or not. Id. The
original draft of Annex 2001 pro-
vided for a de minimis exemption Proper m
that would have granted automatic
approval for any withdrawal of new uses ne
fewer than one million gallons per
day, regardless of location or po-
tential cumulative effects, but the managern
drafters ultimately dropped this
provision from the final version of
the Annex. Thus, Annex 2001 cov-
ers all diversions, exports, and
consumptive uses.
The Annex contains six directives. Directive I
provides that an interstate compact or "such other
agreements, protocols or other arrangements" will
memorialize the binding commitments of the states
and provinces. Annex 2001, at 3. In Directive II, the
signatories commit to an ongoing process of public
participation in the preparation of binding agree-
ments. Notably, if the Annex results in a binding
agreement between the states and provinces, congres-
sional approval will be required under Article I § 10 of
the U.S. Constitution.
The most important of the directives is probably
Directive III, which establishes substantive principles
for new or increased water withdrawals. First, water
loss must be prevented or minimized through return
flow or "sound and economically feasible water conser-
vation measures." Second, there must be no signifi-
cant adverse impacts, either individually or
cumulatively, to the quantity or quality of water or
water-dependent resources. "Water-dependent natural
resources" include the "interacting components of
land, water, and living organisms affected by the waters
of the Great Lakes basin." Annex 2001, at 3. Third,
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the withdrawal must result in an "improvement" of
water or water-dependent resources of the Great
Lakes. Finally, the withdrawal must comply with all ap-
plicable existing laws. Id.
Directive IV commits the parties to consulta-
tion regarding out-of-basin diversions in accor-
dance with the terms of WRDA. Directive V calls
for the design of an information-gathering system
to facilitate implementation of the charter and any
agreement reached pursuant to the charter. Direc-
tive VI makes a series of sweeping, but somewhat
vague, promises to "identify and implement effec-
tive mechanisms for decisionmaking and dispute
resolution." Id.
IJC's 2000 Report reflects many of the same ob-
jectives as Annex 2001. IJC, however, recommends
separate standards for removals and consumptive
uses. Much like Annex 2001, IJC recommends that
major new uses of water be disap-
proved unless cumulative impacts
are fully considered, effective
conservation practices are imple-
mented at the place of use, and
'gement of sound planning is applied. IJC
2000 Report § 11, Rec. 2. By
irily involves contrast, removals of water by di-
version, export or otherwise
should be disapproved, according
to the IJC, unless the proponent
can satisfy the foregoing stan-
dards and also demonstrate that
there are no practical alternatives
for obtaining water and that no
net loss of water resources from the area will result.
Id. § 11, Rec. 1.
Toward Comprehensive Management of the
Great Lakes Water Resources
Despite the many laws and agreements that cur-
rently govern Great Lakes water management, the
controversies that surround the recent, relatively
minor water withdrawal proposals demonstrate the
ongoing failure of the Great Lakes states and
provinces to effectively manage the largest fresh sur-
face water resource in the world. As they strive to
comply with the directives in Annex 2001, the states
and provinces have the opportunity to adopt a com-
prehensive water management program that is cur-
rently lacking in the Great Lakes Basin.
As the 2002 IJC Task Force Report makes clear,
fears about burgeoning consumptive use of water re-
sources in the basin have been "significantly overes-
timated and overstated for the past three decades."
INTERNATIONAL WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE,
PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES: THREE YEAR REVIEW 14 (Nov. 2002). This
fact does not excuse the failure to provide for com-
prehensive management of Great Lakes water re-
sources, but it does suggest that time remains to
address the Great Lakes water management prob-
lems in a thoughtful and deliberate way.
But the window of opportunity will not last forev-
er. The Task Force Report acknowledges that much
scientific uncertainty remains about the extent of cur-
rent usage, the interrelationship between ground and
surface water resources, and perhaps most importantly,
the impact of climate change on Great Lakes water re-
sources. Moreover, the Great Lakes states and
provinces may lack adequate power to limit trade in
their water resources as a result of international trade
agreements, such as NAFTA. As the report notes, this
may be especially true if they fail to adopt water con-
servation requirements. Accordingly, potentially seri-
ous water resource problems loom on the horizon if
the Great Lakes states and provinces fail to seize the
opportunity presented by Annex 2001 to adopt mean-
ingful changes in the current management regime.
Annex 2001 commits the parties to establishing a
new water management system that is "simple, durable,
efficient, retains and respects authority within the
Basin, and most importantly, protects and conserves,
restores and improves the waters and water-dependent
natural resources of the Great Lakes Basin." Annex
2001 at 1. As described previously, Directive III of the
Annex directs the parties to establish a decision making
standard for "new proposals to withdraw water ... as
well as proposals to increase existing water withdrawals
or existing water withdrawal capacity." Annex 2001 at
3. The new standard is supposed to be based upon,
among other things, "environmentally sound and eco-
nomically feasible water conservation measures." Id.
Unfortunately, the Annex does not address directly
the need to conserve water from existing uses. As a re-
sult, the focus of the Decision Making Standard Work-
ing Group seems to be on finding an appropriate
triggering mechanism-a specified volume of water-
for reviewing and passing upon proposed new water
uses. Such a mechanism will not solve the water man-
agement problems facing the Great Lakes. First, set-
ting a trigger below which new uses will not be
reviewed encourages proposals that are just below the
triggering threshold. Moreover, any plan that focuses
solely on new water withdrawals will invite existing
users to maximize their rights by increasing their actu-
al consumption by recapturing and reusing and per-
haps even selling the water, reducing the amount sent
back to the system even while the amount of water
withdrawn remains the same. In the end, a bureaucrat-
ic initiative that governs only new or increased uses
may not yield any real water conservation. Proper
management of new uses necessarily involves manage-
ment of existing uses. For example, one way to ensure
the conservation of water while authorizing new uses
would be to retire or limit existing uses through volun-
taty or incentive-based programs, or by applying tradi-
tional reasonable use standards more strictly. In
discussing the possible terms of a new agreement
among the states and provinces on managing the water
resources of the Great Lakes, it makes no sense to take
this important aspect of the problem off the table.
A Comprehensive Plan for Managing the
Waters of the Great Lakes
Few can doubt the good intentions of all of the
parties associated with managing the water resources
of the Great Lakes. The states, provinces, and federal
governments have repeatedly expressed their genuine
interest in finding ways to improve the current man-
agement system. But for the reasons expressed above,
existing proposals are unlikely to address the current
problems in a meaningful way. Mindful that the ulti-
mate goal of Annex 2001 is to find a simple and
durable framework that respects authority within the
basin and conserves and improves water resources,
Annex 2001 at 1, we offer the following proposal.
First, all of the parties should live up to the com-
mitment that they made in the original Great Lakes
Charter of 1985 to develop a permit and registration
system for all significant water uses in their states,
whether new or preexisting. As the parties move to-
ward meeting the Charter's directives, they should also
tighten the current standards, which require registra-
tion for uses in excess of one hundred thousand gallons
per day and permits for uses in excess of two million
gallons per day. There is no compelling reason not to
insist on permitting for all water uses beyond de min-
imis levels, including groundwater use. Ontario, for ex-
ample, requires permits for all withdrawals in excess of
fifty thousand liters (13,209 gallons) per day, about
one-sixth the amount that triggers registration re-
quirements under the charter. Ontario Water Re-
sources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.40, s.34.
To the extent practical, data collection efforts
should include information about both withdrawals
and consumption. Once the states and provinces have
developed and implemented comprehensive permit
and data collection systems, a more reliable picture of
current water uses throughout the Great Lakes Basin
will emerge. Most importantly, the data will show
more clearly the levels of withdrawal and consumption
allowed by each state and province within the basin.
Reliable data opens enormous opportunities for con-
servation and better management.
First, accurate data will make it unnecessary to es-
tablish a "trigger" for reviewing individual new water
uses. The trigger concept would require joint review by
all of the Great Lakes states and provinces of all water
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uses that exceed the triggering level. Instead of review-
ing individual uses, a trigger might be established for
reviewing state or provincial decisions that result in a
cumulative increase of water usage above a certain
threshold. In this way, even the smallest new water uses
will count toward the cumulative totals. Moreover,
cases triggering review likely will be rare because the
states and provinces can avoid review simply by con-
serving their water resources in ways that will accom-
modate new uses without exceeding the threshold.
An alternate and perhaps simpler way to manage
the water of the Great Lakes Basin would be to cap
total water usage and give each state and province a
percentage of the cap that it could not exceed. The cap
might be set annually or over a period of years, and it
could be made dependent on water conditions and
trends. In high water years, the cap
might grow; in low water years, the
cap might decrease. So long as a
state or province stays under its per- The ultima
centage of the total cap, however, it
would be free to use its share of
water as it chooses. In this way, each 2001 is tof
state and province has a powerful
incentive-lacking in the current durable fi
proposals and law-to conserve its
water resources because conserving respects aut.
water consumed by existing users
frees it for other users.
Although the allocation of a per- basin and
centage would, no doubt, be difficult
to negotiate, the current percentage improves z
of water consumption by the individ-
ual states and provinces could serve as
a useful starting point. The 2000 IJC
Report already includes data on consumptive use levels by
each state and province, but more accurate data must be
developed in advance of any agreement through the data
collection systems described above. Adjustments would
then be made to reflect instream needs for fisheries and
wildlife, as well as reserved rights for federal public lands
and Indian reservations within the basin. Once the per-
centages are established, a central commission-such as
the IJC -could be entrusted with managing the program.
Management tasks would likely include setting and adjust-
ing the cap; collecting, auditing, and disseminating water
usage data from the states and provinces; and adjusting
and ensuring compliance with the cap percentages.
Beyond the basic operation of this program, the
commission might also develop and implement a trad-
ing program whereby states and provinces could buy
and sell water resources among themselves. Water mar-
keting has generally worked well in those limited cir-
cumstances where it is made available from a large pool,
typically a reservoir, where the ecological and social im-
pacts of the point of diversion and return flows are
roughly equivalent. If such a program were adopted, the
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Great Lakes governments should retain the authority to
review their decisions periodically as experience, chang-
ing needs, or political considerations dictate.
Assuming that the Great Lakes states and
provinces agree to such a strategy, they will still want
to address their long-standing concerns about out-of-
basin diversions. If states and provinces are free to
manage water within their caps as they see fit, they
may choose to allow more water to leave the Great
Lakes Basin than is authorized under current law. In
theory, this should not be a problem. An out-of-basin
diversion, which can and should be treated as a 100
percent consumptive use, will have no greater impact
on the basin than an in-basin use that consumes the
same amount of water. States and provinces may, how-
ever, have legitimate concerns about their ability to re-
store water to the basin if and when
it is needed there. To address this
issue, the parties might agree to
oal ofAnnex limit out-of-basin diversions to a
term of years, to limit the total
amount of water that can be divert-
a simple and ed out of the basin by each party, or
to condition out-of-basin permits
ework that on compensatory water resources
in the event that critical needs
ty within the arise. Moreover, by treating out-of-
basin water as a 100 percent con-
sumptive use, the states and
serves and provinces will have a strong incen-
tive to keep water in the basin
'r resources. where it can be used and reused
without counting against their cap.
This strategy is consistent with the
conservation and improvement
principles of Annex 2001, which should be incorporat-
ed within each jurisdiction as the states and provinces
move toward implementation of a comprehensive
water management program.
Despite numerous international and interjurisdic-
tional agreements, the water resources of the greatest
freshwater resource in the world are not well managed.
A new Great Lakes management regime must be de-
veloped that replaces current incentives to waste water
resources with meaningful incentives to conserve
water resources. Annex 2001 offers the Great Lakes
states and provinces an important opportunity to
change their water management strategies in funda-
mental ways. Early indications from the negotiating
parties suggest, however, some reluctance to discard
preconceived ideas about how best to manage and con-
serve this crucial international resource. Opportunities
to make the kind of fundamental changes that are
needed in the current management of the Great Lakes
water resources will likely be rare. An opportunity ex-
ists now. For the sake of the Great Lakes, the states
and provinces should embrace it.
